American-made precision weaponry in Ukraine has been facing challenges due to Russian electronic warfare. This has resulted in a decrease in the effectiveness of US precision weapons such as the HIMARS-fired Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems and air-launched Joint Direct Attack Munitions. Lt. Gen. Antonio Aguto, the commander of Security Assistance Group-Ukraine, acknowledged this issue in December 2023, highlighting that electronic warfare targeting the US' most precise capabilities is a significant challenge. It is worth mentioning that both the US and Ukraine are actively collaborating to find solutions to overcome these obstacles.
According to Mark Cancian, a former Marine Corps colonel and senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the prevalence of GPS spoofing in Ukraine emphasizes the need to address a long-standing issue recognized by the Department of Defense (DoD): the detrimental impact of wartime spoofing on the efficiency of its weaponry.
Electronic warfare can be conducted through inexpensive yet powerful technology, and both factions in the conflict are making extensive use of it. These tactics are not limited to thwarting precision-guided munitions but can also disrupt the communication between an operator and a reconnaissance or strike drone.
Electronic warfare encompasses a wide range of cost-effective options, according to Thomas Withington, an expert in electronic warfare and air defense, and an associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute. He explains that jamming, a relatively straightforward technique, involves inundating a GNSS receiver with noise to disrupt its reception of the position, navigation, and timing signal from the satellite, causing it to lose its accuracy.
On the other hand, spoofing entails transmitting false GNSS information to the navigation system of a weapon, leading it astray from its intended course or trajectory. Jamming is a simpler method that can be executed using less expensive equipment and personnel, whereas spoofing is typically employed in more specific scenarios, such as concealing locations from adversaries.
Although both techniques serve distinct purposes, they can have significant adverse effects on the precision and reliability of weaponry.
Ukraine has successfully confronted the challenge by either resorting to jamming techniques or identifying and neutralizing Russian electronic warfare facilities. By relying on alternative systems that are not reliant on GPS or other guidance systems, like an inertial guidance system, they can overcome the issue. However, this approach may not always be feasible.
The Russian military has likely shown an increased interest in utilizing electronic warfare in combat, particularly over the past year, due to its effectiveness in countering precision weapons provided by the US.
Precision systems such as Excalibur and GMLRS, which can be launched from US-supplied M777 howitzers and HIMARS, are experiencing significantly reduced accuracy as a result of jamming.
According to Withington, the concept behind weapons like Excalibur and JDAMs was that their reliance on GNSS was meant to offer a certain level of precision. However, the effectiveness and precision of these highly-touted weapons are now being questioned, with implications not only for the Ukrainians but also for the confidence others have in these systems.
Daniel Patt, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, informed Congress in March that the 155mm GPS-guided Excalibur artillery shell had a 70% success rate in hitting targets when first used in Ukraine. However, after six weeks, the efficiency dropped to just 6% as the Russians adjusted their electronic warfare systems to counter it.
Patt also mentioned that the optimal efficiency of a new weapon system lasts for only about two weeks before countermeasures are developed. This is crucial information for the US as it readies itself for potential future conflicts.
The conflict in Ukraine has been a valuable source of intelligence, allowing the US to observe how its precision weapons function in the face of modern threats like electronic warfare. This practical experience supplements years of research and discussions among US defense officials and experts regarding the impact of electronic warfare on America's military capabilities in a potential conflict with a major power, as well as the necessary adaptations.
The Department of Defense has been actively addressing these challenges by exploring strategies such as utilizing narrower signal bands or generating stronger signals to counter jamming attempts. However, it is important to remain cautious about expecting revolutionary advancements, as adversaries continuously develop countermeasures to mitigate the effectiveness of new technologies.
Despite the obstacles, the US should not disregard its precision weapons in the event of a conflict with a major power like Russia or China, both of which are likely to employ electronic warfare tactics. While Russian jamming signals may pose a significant threat, they also present vulnerabilities that can be exploited. The ongoing innovation and adaptation in response to electronic warfare challenges were highlighted by Doug Bush, the Army's acquisition chief, who emphasized the importance of having multiple guidance options for precision weapons. The recent announcement by the US Air Force regarding the development of add-on seekers for extended-range JDAMs reflects this commitment to enhancing weapon resilience against electronic jamming.
Efforts to address the challenge of precision weapons in the face of threats constitute just one aspect of a comprehensive solution, as stated by Withington. Additional approaches to tackle this issue involve utilizing alternative weapons and prioritizing the targeting of the source of electronic warfare signals at the early stages of a conflict.
With regards to establishing electromagnetic superiority, forces such as the US and its allies must anticipate future battles. By preventing adversaries from utilizing the electromagnetic spectrum in any capacity, it would significantly diminish, if not entirely prevent, their ability to interfere with our weaponry.
Nonetheless, the ongoing adaptation to Russia's jamming by the US and Ukraine, coupled with the lessons learned from the war, will perpetuate the continuous cycle of innovation, as highlighted by Bush.
Cancian emphasizes that the back-and-forth nature of measure, counter-measure, and counter-countermeasure witnessed in Ukraine is a common occurrence in warfare. He further asserts that no single technology can provide an ultimate advantage.
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